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Abstract. Nowadays, students can be assessed not only by means of pencil-and-
paper tests, but also by electronic exams which they take in examination centers
or even from home. Electronic exams are appealing as they can reach larger au-
diences, but they are exposed to new threats that can potentially ruin the whole
exam business. These threats are amplified by two issues: the lack of understand-
ing of what security means for electronic exams (except the old concern about
students cheating), and the absence of tools to verify whether an exam process
is secure. This paper addresses both issues by introducing a formal description
of several fundamental authentication and privacy properties, and by establishing
the first theoretical framework for an automatic analysis of exam security. It uses
the applied pi-calculus as a framework and ProVerif as a tool. Three exam proto-
cols are checked in depth: two Internet exam protocols of recent design, and the
pencil-and-paper exam used by the University of Grenoble. The analysis high-
lights several weaknesses. Some invalidate authentication and privacy even when
all parties are honest; others show that security depends on the honesty of parties,
an often unjustified assumption in modern exams.
1 Introduction
Exams are used to assess the skills, the capabilities, and the knowledge of students
and professionals. Traditional exams are taken pencil-and-paper at hand. In contrast,
modern exams make a partial or complete use of information and communication tech-
nology. They are called electronic exams, in short e-exams.
Running e-exams promises to be cheaper than staging traditional tests. E-exams are
deployed easily, and they are flexible in where and when exams can be set [1]; their test
sessions are open to a very large public of candidates and, if the implementation allows
automatic marking, their results are immediately available. We are neutral with respect
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whether e-exams will improve the way people are assessed; undoubtedly though, their
use has raised considerably. Several universities, such as MIT, Stanford, and Berkeley,
just to cite a very few of them, have began to offer university courses using the Massive
Open Online Course (MOOC) platforms which offer taking e-exams. Other institutions,
such as CISCO and Microsoft, ETS5 and ECDL6, have already since long time adopted
proprietary platforms to run electronically the tests required by their individual certifi-
cation programs.
This migration towards information technology is changing considerably how tak-
ing exams looks like, but the approach in coping with their security has remained the
same: it is mainly about preventing students from cheating [2]. To discourage such
practices, institutions prefer invigilated tests. Where it is not possible to have human
invigilators, a software running on the student computer is used, for instance ProctorU7.
Such measures are limited and insufficient. The security as well as the trustworthiness
and the reliability of exams are today threatened not only by students. Obviously there
are threats coming from the use of information technology; besides, recent scandals
have shown that bribed examiners and dishonest exam authorities are as willing to tam-
per with exams as students (e.g., see [3, 4]). When this happens, the consequences are
generally worse than those due to cheating. This is problematic since the growth in use
of exam protocols has not been followed, nor preceded, by a rigorous understanding
and analysis of their security. Looking at the security claims of the few available exam
specifications, we realized that such claims are argued high level; moreover, they rely
on implicit trust assumptions that, similarly to assuming that authorities are honest, are
not justifiable anymore. Thus, there is the need for a formal framework to define and
analyze the security of traditional and e-exam protocols. This paper fulfils this need.
Contributions: We present the first formalization for exams, and we model both tra-
ditional and electronic protocols. We define several fundamental security properties
in this domain: (a) authentication properties, namely Answer Origin Authentication,
Form Authorship, Form Authenticity, and Mark Authenticity, and (b) privacy prop-
erties, containing Question Indistinguishability, Anonymous Marking, Anonymous Ex-
aminer, Mark Privacy, and Mark Anonymity. All properties are defined in the applied
pi-calculus [5]. ProVerif [6, 7] is used to verify them on a given model of an exam pro-
tocol. All our verification code is available on line.8
We validate our approach on three existing exam systems. We check them against a
Dolev-Yao attacker, and also consider cases with corrupted participants that can com-
municate with the attacker and so indirectly collude. The first and the second system
that we validate are electronic exams. They have been recently proposed respectively
by Huszti et al. [8], and by Giustolisi et al. [9]. The last one is a pencil-and-paper exam
system currently used at the University of Grenoble. It resembles other European Uni-
versity exams where students write their personal data and a pseudonym on a piece of






Our security analysis (see Section 4.2, 5.2, and 6.2) gives insights on the security of
the protocols. In some cases our properties hold even in presence of corrupted parties,
in others they are violated already without assuming corrupted parties and just because
of the attacker; in still others, we have attacks only when a subset of parties is corrupted;
in a few cases the properties hold under condition that all parties are honest. Where pos-
sible and meaningful we discuss how to fix the weaknesses. In summary, our analysis
reveals exactly how strong or how weak those systems are in realistic and modern exam
contexts.
This work is an extended version of [10]. It discusses the framework in more detail,
suggests fixes for a flawed exam protocol, and studies one new use case, the Grenoble
exam. This proves that the framework can be applied to analyze the security not only
of electronic exam protocols (as done in [10]), but also of pencil-and-paper exam pro-
cedures. By doing so, this work presents itself as the first theoretical framework for the
security analysis of all kinds of exam protocols, traditional, computer-based, computer-
assisted, and internet-based.
Related Work: Only a few papers propose e-exam protocols that guarantee some secu-
rity, mainly under the assumption that some authority is trusted [8, 11–13]. Few other
works [2, 14, 15] list some relevant properties for e-exams, yet only informally.
To the best of our knowledge, no formal definitions have been given for the security
properties of traditional and e-exam systems. There are instead papers presenting the
formalization and verification of properties in domains that seem related to e-exams,
namely e-voting [16–21], e-auction systems [22–24], or cloud-based conference man-
agement systems [25]. Some of the security properties therein studied remind those we
are presenting for exams. For instance, Answer Origin Authentication is analogous to
voter and bidder authentication. Mark Privacy reminds ballot privacy and losing bids
privacy. Yet, there are fundamental differences. In exams, Answer Authorship should
be preserved even in the presence of colluding candidates. Conversely, vote (bid) au-
thorship is not a problem for e-voting (e-auction), in fact unlinkability between a voter
(bidder) and her vote (bid) is a desired property. An other important property for exams
is to keep exam questions secret until the exam ends. We do not find such a property
in e-voting where the candidates are previously known to the voters, and in e-auction
where the goods to bid for are previously known to the bidders. Moreover, properties
such as Anonymous Marking, meaning that the examiners do not know whose copy
they are grading, evaluates to a sort of fixed-term anonymity. This property is meant
to hold during the marking, but is trivially falsified when the marks are assigned to the
candidates. In the cloud-based protocol for conference management that supports ap-
plications, evaluations, and decisions by Arapinis et al. [25], the authors identify and
analyze a few privacy properties (secrecy and unlinkability) that should hold despite
a malicious-but-cautious cloud. In e-exams we have to consider a different attacker
model: corruption is not limited to the server, and the attacker is not necessarily cau-
tious.
Finally, there are a few works studying the formal security analysis of physical
protocols [26–29], but none of them considers traditional pencil-and-paper exams.
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Outline: In Section 2, we model exam protocols in the applied pi-calculus. Then, we
specify security properties in Section 3. We validate our framework by analysing the
security of two e-exam protocols [8] and [9] in Section 4 and 5, and one traditional
exam in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we discuss our results and outline future work.
2 Modelling
We model exam protocols in the applied pi-calculus [5], a process calculus designed for
the verification of cryptographic protocols. To perform the automatic protocol verifica-
tion we use Proverif [6, 7]. This tool uses a process description based on the applied pi-
calculus, but has syntactical extensions, for example its language is enriched by events
to check reachability and correspondence properties; besides it can check observational
equivalence properties. We use events to define various authentication properties, and
we model privacy properties as equivalence properties.
Honest Party Model. Exam parties are modelled as processes in the applied pi-
calculus. These processes communicate via public or private channels, can create keys
or fresh random values, and perform tests and cryptographic operations, which are func-
tions on terms with respect to an equational theory describing their properties. A party
is honest when it follows its specification and does not leak information to the attacker.
Threat Model. Threats come from a Dolev-Yao attacker [30] who has full control of
the network except private channels. He can eavesdrop, remove, substitute, duplicate
and delay messages that the parties are sending one another, and insert messages of
his choice on the public channels, but also play the protocol. Threats come also from
corrupted parties, who communicate with the attacker, share personal data (e.g., secret
keys) with him, or receive orders (e.g., how to answer a question) from him. We model
corrupted parties as in Definition 8 from [31]: if process P is honest, then P c1,c2 is its
corrupted version. This variant is exactly as P , but uses channels c1 and c2 to commu-
nicate with the attacker. Through c1, P c1,c2 sends all its inputs and freshly generated
names (but not other channel names). From c2, P c1,c2 receives messages that can influ-
ence its behaviour.
Exam Model. The exam is the parallel composition of the processes modelling the
exam parties. We have at least the following parties: candidates who sit for the exam; the
examiners who mark the answers submitted by the candidates; the question committee,
which prepares the exam questions; the exam authorities, which conduct the exam, and
include registrars, invigilators, exam collectors, and a notification committee. In some
protocols, an authority can be responsible of two or more roles.
Definition 1 (Exam protocol). An exam protocol is a tuple (C,E,Q,A1, . . . , Al, n˜p),
where C is the process executed by the candidates, E is the process executed by the
examiners, Q is the process executed by the question committee, Ai’s are the processes
executed by the authorities, and n˜p is the set of private channel names.
All candidates execute the same process C, and all examiners the same process E.
However, different candidates and examiners are instantiated with different variable
values, e.g., keys, identities, and answers.
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Definition 2 (Exam instance). An exam instance of an exam protocol given by the
tuple (C,E,A1, . . . , Al, n˜) is a closed process EP = νn˜.(Cσid1σa1 | . . . |Cσidjσaj |
Eσid′1σm1 | . . . |Eσid′kσmk |Qσq|A1σdist | . . . |Al), where n˜ is the set of all restricted
names, which includes the private channels; Cσidiσai ’s are the processes run by the
candidates, the substitutions σidi and σai specify the identity and the answers of the i
th
candidate respectively; Eσid′iσmi ’s are the processes run by the examiners, the sub-
stitution σid′i specifies the i
th examiner’s identity, and σmi specifies for each possible
question/answer pair the corresponding mark; Q is the process run by the question
committee, the substitution σq specifies the exam questions; the Ai’s are the processes
run by the exam authorities, the substitution σdist determines which answers will be
submitted to which examiners for grading. Without loss of generality, we assume that
A1 distributes the copies to the examiners.
Definition 2 handles equally examiners that are machines and examiners that are hu-
mans: they are both entities that mark answers. Q and A1 can coincide when there is
only one authority A: in that case, Qσq|A1σdist is simplified as Aσqσdist .
We organize the exam’s steps in four phases. (1) Registration: the exam authority
(the registrar) creates a new examination and checks the eligibility of candidates who
attempts to register for it; (2) Examination: the exam authority authenticates the candi-
dates, and sends to each of them an exam form that contains the exam questions. Each
candidate fills the form with his answer, and submits it to the exam collector; (3) Mark-
ing: the authority distributes the forms submitted by the candidates to the examiners,
who in their turn evaluate and mark them; (4) Notification: once the forms have been
evaluated, the marks are notified to the candidates.
3 Security Properties
We formalize authentication and privacy properties. They best represent exam security
requirements as corroborated by other works [2, 14, 15]. We introduce four authentica-
tion properties meant to ensure the associations between the candidate’s identity, the
answer, and the mark being preserved through all phases. When authentication holds
there is no loss, no injection, and in general no manipulation of the exam forms from
examination to notification. We also introduce five privacy properties that ensure the
anonymity of critical parties.
It is worth to report that in the context of exams other classes of properties might be
of interest, for instance verifiability, reliability, or accountability, but we do not study
them here. This task is ongoing work.
3.1 Authentication properties
We model our authentication properties as correspondence properties, a well-known
approach [32, 33]. Specific events, whose parameters refer to the pieces of information
in the exam form, flag important steps in the execution of the exam. Events are annota-
tions that do not change a process behavior, but are inserted at precise locations to allow
reasoning about the exam’s execution. In the following id c is the candidate identity,
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ques the question(s), ans the answer(s), mark the mark(s), id form is an identifier of
the exam form used during marking, and id e is the examiner’s identity. The id form is
only used to identify an exam form during marking. This could be a pseudonym to allow
anonymous marking, or simply the candidate identity if the marking is not anonymous.
In our model, we use the following events.
• reg(id c): is the event inserted into the registrar process at the location where
candidate id c has successfully registered for the exam.
• submitted(id c, ques, ans): is the event inserted into the process of candidate
id c in the examination phase, injected on the candidate process at the location where
he sends his answer ans corresponding to the question ques .
• collected(id c, ques, ans): is the event inserted into the exam collector’s process
in the examination phase, just after it received and accepted the exam form (id c, ques ,
ans) from candidate id c.
• distrib(id c, ques, ans, id form, id e): is the event inserted into the authority
process in the marking phase, when it assigns the exam form (id c, ques, ans) from
candidate id c to the examiner id e using the identifier id form .
In exam with only one examiner the event distrib seems not necessary, but it is: it
links exam forms to id form and, for instance, helps revealing when identical answers
are graded multiple times (and not necessarily with the same mark).
• marked(ques, ans,mark , id form, id e): is the event inserted into the exam-
iner id e’s process in the marking phase, at the location where he marked the ques-
tion/answer pair (ques, ans) identified by id form with the mark mark .
• notified(id c,mark): is the event inserted into the process of candidate id c in
the notification phase, just after he received and accepted the mark mark from the
responsible authority.
Authentication properties are correspondence properties among these events. All
properties have the following structure: “on every trace the event e1 is preceded by the
event e2”.
The first authentication property is Answer Origin Authentication. When satisfied,
it ensures that only one exam form from each candidate and only the forms submitted
by eligible candidates (registered) are actually collected.
Definition 3 (Answer Origin Authentication) An exam protocol ensures Answer Ori-
gin Authentication if each occurrence of the event collected(id c, ques, ans), for every
exam process EP , is preceded by a distinct occurrence of the event reg(id c) on every
execution trace.
At examination phase, each candidate submits his exam form with an answer, and the
collector collects the forms. Form Authorship ensures that the contents of each collected
exam form (id c, ques , and ans) are not modified after submission.
Definition 4 (Form Authorship) An exam protocol ensures Form Authorship if, for
every exam process EP , each occurrence of the event collected(id c, ques, ans) is
preceded by a distinct occurrence of the event submitted(id c, ques, ans) on every
execution trace.
Similarly, Form Authenticity ensures that the content of each exam form is not modified
after the collection and until after the form is marked by an examiner.
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Definition 5 (Form Authenticity) An exam protocol ensures Form Authenticity if each
occurrence of the event marked(ques, ans,mark , id form, id e), for every exam pro-
cess EP , is preceded on every execution trace by a distinct occurrence of the events
collected(id c, ques, ans) and distrib(id c, ques, ans, id form, id e).
At notification phase, the candidate should receive the mark which was assigned by the
examiner to his answer. We call this property Mark Authenticity.
Definition 6 (Mark Authenticity) An exam protocol ensures Mark Authenticity if, for
every exam process EP , each occurrence of the event notified(id c,mark) is preceded
by a distinct occurrence of the events marked(ques, ans,mark , id form, id e) and
distrib(id c, ques, ans, id form, id e) on every execution trace.
Note that Mark Authenticity ensures that the candidate is notified with the mark deliv-
ered by the examiner on the answer assigned to him by the authority. This answer may
be different from that submitted by the candidate. Only if also Form Authorship and
Form Authenticity hold then the candidate can be sure that the assigned and submitted
answers are identical. Moreover, Mark Authenticity does not guarantee that the mark is
computed correctly.
3.2 Privacy properties
We model our privacy properties as observational equivalence, a standard choice for
such kind of properties [33, 34]. We use the labeled bisimilarity (≈l) to express the
equivalence between two processes [5]. Informally, two processes are equivalent if an
observer has no way to tell them apart.
Notation. In the following, we use two simplifying notations: (a) “EPI [ ]”, called
context, is the process EP without the identities in the set I . We use it, for instance,
to specify exactly the processes for candidates id1 and id2 without repeating the entire
exam instance; in that case we rewrite EP as EP{id1,id2}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 ]; (b)
“EP |e” stands for process EP without the code that follows the event e.
The first privacy property says that questions are kept secret until the exam starts.
Definition 7 (Question Indistinguishability) An exam protocol ensures Question In-
distinguishability if for any exam process EP that ends with the registration phase, any
questions q1 and q2, we have that: EP{idQ}[Qσq1 ]|reg ≈l EP{idQ}[Qσq2 ]|reg .
Question Indistinguishability states that two processes with different questions have to
be observationally equivalent until the end of the registration phase. This prevents the
attacker from obtaining information about the exam questions before the examination
phase starts. This property requires the question committee to be honest; otherwise the
property is trivially violated since the committee reveals the questions to the attacker.
However, it is particularly interesting to consider corrupted participants, for example
candidates might be interested in obtaining the questions in advance. We can do this
by replacing honest candidates with corrupted ones. For example, if we assume that
candidate id1 is corrupted, we obtain
EP{id1,idQ}[(Cσid1σa1)
c1,c2 |Qσq1 ]|reg≈l EP{id1,idQ}[(Cσid1σa1)c1,c2 |Qσq2 ]|reg
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The next property ensures that the marking process is done anonymously, i.e., that
two instances where candidates swap their answers cannot be distinguished until after
the end of the marking phase.
Definition 8 (Anonymous Marking) An exam protocol ensures Anonymous Marking
if for any exam process EP that ends with the marking phase, any two candidates id1
and id2, and any two answers a1 and a2, we have that:
EP{id1,id2}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 ]|mark≈l EP{id1,id2}[Cσid1σa2 |Cσid2σa1 ]|mark .
Anonymous Marking ensures that the process where id1 answers a1 and id2 answers a2
is equivalent to the process where id1 answers a2 and id2 answers a1. This prevents the
attacker to obtain the identity of the candidate who submitted a certain answer before the
marking phase ends. For this property, it is interesting to consider corrupted examiners.
It can be done using the same technique employed for corrupted candidates outlined
above. We can also have some corrupted candidates, however the candidates id1 and id2
who are assigned the two different answers have to be honest – otherwise the property
can be trivially violated by one of them revealing his answer to the attacker.
To prevent bribing or coercion of the examiners, it might be interesting to ensure
their anonymity, so that no candidate knows which examiner marked his copy.
Definition 9 (Anonymous Examiner) An exam protocol ensures Anonymous Exam-
iner if for any exam process EP , any two candidates id1 and id2, any two examiners
id ′1 and id
′
2, and any two marks m1 and m2, we have that: EP{id1,id2,id′1,id′2,idA1}
[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |Eσid′1σm1 |Eσid′2σm2 |A1σdist1 ] ≈l EP{id1,id2,id′1,id′2,idA1} [C
σid1 σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |Eσid′1σm2 |Eσid′2σm1 |A1σdist2 ] where σdist1 attributes the exam
form of candidate id1 to examiner id
′
1 and the exam form of candidate id2 to examiner
id ′2, and σdist2 attributes the exam form of candidate id1 to examiner id
′
2 and the exam
form of candidate id2 to examiner id
′
1.
Anonymous Examiner ensures that a process in which examiner id ′1 grades the exam
form of candidate id1 and examiner id ′2 grades that of candidate id2 cannot be distin-
guished from a process in which id ′1 grades the exam form of id2 and id
′
2 grades that
of id1. Note that to ensure that in both cases the candidates receive the same mark, we
also have to swap σm1 and σm2 between the examiners. Similar to Anonymous Mark-
ing, this property prevents the attacker to obtain or guess the identity of the examiner
who marked a certain answer. Anonymous Examiner requires that the examiners id′1 and
id′2 are honest, otherwise it will trivially violated by one of them revealing the mark he
gave. We can again include corrupted candidates as they might be interested in finding
out which examiner marked their copies.
In some exams settings the marks have to remain private. This is formalized in the
next property.
Definition 10 (Mark Privacy) An exam protocol ensures Mark Privacy if for any exam
process EP , any marks m1, m2, we have that: EP{id′}[Eσid′σm1 ] ≈l EP{id′}[E
σid′σm2 ].
Mark Privacy guarantees that two processes where the examiner id′1 assigns for the
same answer, entailed by the same context EP , two different marks m1, m2, cannot be
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distinguished from each other. Depending on the exam policy this can be an optional
property since some exams system may publicly disclose the marks of the candidates.
However, the intuition here is that candidate’s performance should not be known to any
other candidate. Again, we can assume that some candidates are corrupted and try to
find out the marks of their colleagues, or that an examiner tries to find out the mark
achieved by a candidate. The candidate who is assigned the two different marks has to
be honest – otherwise the property is violated by him revealing his mark to the attacker.
Similarly the examiner assigning the marks has to be honest, otherwise he can reveal
the mark himself.
The previous definition of Mark Privacy ensures that the attacker cannot know the
mark of a candidate. A weaker variant of Mark Privacy is Mark Anonymity, i.e., the
attacker might know the list of all marks, but is unable to associate a mark to its cor-
responding candidate. This is often the case in practice, where a list of pseudonyms
(e.g., student numbers) and marks is published.
Definition 11 (Mark Anonymity) An exam protocol ensures Mark Anonymity if for
any exam process EP , any candidates id1, id2, any examiner id′1, any answers a1, a2
and a distribution σdist that assigns the answers of both candidates to the examiner,
and two substitutions σma and σmb which are identical, except that σma attributes the
mark m1 to the answer a1 and m2 to a2, whereas σmb attributes m2 to the answer a1
and m1 to a2, we have that: EP{id1,id2,id′1,idA1}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |Eσid′1σma|A1σdist] ≈l EP{id1,id2,id′1,idA1}[Cσid1σa1 |Cσid2σa2 |Eσid′1σmb |A1σdist]
The definition states that if an examiner id′1, who is assigned the same answers a1 and
a2 as σdist is unchanged, swaps the marks between these answers, the two situations
cannot be distinguished by the attacker. This means that a list of marks can be public, but
the attacker must be unable to link the marks to the candidates. Again, we can consider
corrupted parties, but this definition requires the two concerned candidates and the two
concerned examiners to be honest. Otherwise they can simply reveal the answer and the
associated mark, which allows to distinguish both cases.
It is also easy to see that a protocol ensuring Mark Privacy also ensures Mark
Anonymity. In fact, σma and σmb are special cases of σm1 and σm2 .
4 Huszti & Petho˝ Protocol
We first analyze the protocol by Huszti & Petho˝ [8] (in short, H&P protocol). This
protocol aims to ensure authentication and privacy for e-exams in presence of corrupted
candidates, examiners, and exam authorities; the guarantees are argued only informally
in [8]. Notably from a point of view of this paper, all arguments supporting privacy rely
on the reliability of a single component, the reusable anonymous return channel, or
RARC [35]. A RARC implements anonymous two-way conversations. A sender posts a
message to a recipient and the RARC ensures its anonymity; in its turn, the recipient can
reply to that message without knowing nor learning the sender’s identity, sure that the
RARC will dispatch it to actual sender. RARC ensures the anonymity of the messages,
and the entire conversation remains untraceable to an external attacker, but it does not
guarantee the secrecy of the messages [35].
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A RARC is implemented by a re-encryption mixnet. The mix servers jointly gen-
erate and share an ElGamal key pair (PKMIX , SKMIX ) and a pair of public/private
signing keys (SPKMIX , SSKMIX ). The sender A and the receiver B also hold El-
Gamal public/private key pairs, (PKA, SKA) and (PKB , SKB) respectively. A and
B are represented by IDA and IDB , identity tags which can be for example A’s and
B’s email addresses. To send the message m to B, sender A submits to the mixnet the
tuple Mix (m,A,B) that denotes ({IDA,PKA}PKMIX , {m}PKMIX , {IDB , PKB}PKMIX )
and proves knowledge of {IDA,PKA} and of {IDB ,PKB}. The proofs of knowledge
are claimed to impede the attacker’s decrypting the triplets by using the mixnet as an
oracle (in Section 4.2 we falsify this claim). The mixnet waits to collect more triplets
and shuffles them. Then, it adds a checksum to the triplets, which is supposed to vouch
for integrity (again, we disprove this claim in Section 4.2).
The message m is then re-encrypted with the public key of B using a switching
encryption keys technique. The mixnet signs the encrypted public key of A. Thus B
receives the pair (sign({IDA,PKA}PKMIX ,SKMIX ), {m}PKB ) where sign(x, sk) is
message x plus the signature with the secret key sk. Then B replies to A with a new
messagem′ by sending to the mixnet (Mix (m′, B,A), sign({IDA,PKA}PKMIX ,SKMIX ))
and proving only knowledge of {IDB ,PKB}. The mixnet checks the proof and the sig-
nature, and then processes the tuples like a normal message.
4.1 Protocol Description
We briefly review the H&P protocol here, for the full details see the original paper [8].
The protocol relies upon different cryptographic building blocks. The ElGamal cryp-
tosystem [36] is used to provide parties with public/private key pairs. A RARC im-
plements anonymous two-way communication. A network of servers (NET) provides
a timed-release service. It will create and revoke a candidate’s pseudonym. More pre-
cisely, the NET’s contribution to the pseudonym is shared among the servers using the
threshold Shamir secret sharing system [37]. At notification, a subset of the NET servers
use their shares to recover the secret and de-anonymize candidate: the exam authority
can so associate the answer with the corresponding candidate. To avoid plagiarism, the
protocol assumes that no candidate reveals his private key to another candidate, and that
invigilators supervise candidates during the examination.
The original protocol has five phases: examiner and the candidate registration, ex-
amination, marking and notification. To match this structure with our exam model,
which has four phases, we merge the candidate and examiner registrations into a single
registration phase.
Examiner Registration: The exam authority publishes the public parameters to iden-
tify a new examination. The question committee then signs and sends the questions and
the starting time of the phases encrypted with the public key of the RARC mixnet.
The mixnet forwards the message only when the examination begins. The examiner
is then provided with a pseudonym, which is jointly generated by the exam authority
and the examiner. The examiner verifies the correctness of the pseudonym by using a
zero-knowledge proof (ZKP). Then, the examiner sends his pseudonym to the exam
authority, and proves the knowledge of his secret key.
10
Candidate Registration: The registration of a candidate slightly differs from the
registration of an examiner. The candidate pseudonym is jointly calculated by the exam
authority, the candidate, and also the NET to provide anonymity for the candidates. The
NET stores the secret values used for the pseudonym generation, which can be used to
de-anonymize the candidate after the examination has finished. Again, the candidate
finally verifies the correctness of his pseudonym using a ZKP.
Examination: The candidate sends his pseudonym via the RARC to the exam au-
thority and proves the knowledge of his private key. Then, the exam authority checks
whether the candidate is registered for the examination, and sends him the questions
signed by the question committee. The candidate sends his answer, again via the RARC.
The exam authority replies with a receipt which consists of the hash of all parameters
seen by the exam authority during the examination, the transcription of the ZKPs, and
the time when the answer was submitted.
Marking: The exam authority chooses an examiner who is eligible for the examina-
tion, and forwards him the answer via the RARC. Then the examiner assigns a mark to
the answer, and authenticates them using a ZKP.
Notification: When all the answers are marked, the NET de-anonymizes the pseudo-
nyms linked to the answers. The exam authority stores the marks.
4.2 Formal Analysis
The equational theory depicted in Figure 1 models the cryptographic primitives used
within the H&P protocol. It includes the well-known model for digital signatures. It
also describe zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP). The theory we use is inspired by Backes
et al. [38] which models a ZKP of a secret exponent as two functions, zkp proof for
proof, and zkp sec for verification. The function zkp proof (public, secret) takes as
arguments a secret and public parameters (i.e. the exponent and the generator to the
power of the exponent). It can be constructed only by the prover who knows the secret
parameter. The verification function zkpsec(zkp proof (public, secret), verinfo) takes
as arguments the proof function and the verification parameter verinfo. The verifier
only accepts the proof if the relation between verinfo and secret is satisfied. We support
the model for the ZKP of the equality of discrete logarithms check proof with tables
in ProVerif. This is due to the difficulties of ProVerif when dealing with associativity
of multiple exponents, which is used in the H&P protocol. In particular, this approach
is needed to let ProVerif terminate for Mark Privacy and Mark Anonymity. It is sound
because it limits the attacker capability to generate fake ZKPs, as he cannot write and
read ProVerif’s table. Nevertheless, ProVerif still finds counterexamples that falsify the
property, as shall we see later.
We also assume the same generator is used for generating the pseudonyms of candi-
dates and examiners. This is sound because we distinguish the roles, and each principal
is identified by its public key. We replace the candidate identity with his corresponding
pseudonym inside the events to check authentication properties. We note that the re-
placement is also sound because the equational theory preserves the bijective mapping
between the keys that identify the candidate and his pseudonym.
First we analyze the RARC alone and show that there are attacks on anonymity and
privacy (see next paragraph).
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getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
exp(exp(exp(g, x), y), z) = exp(exp(exp(g, y), z), x)
checkproof (xproof (p, p′, t, exp(t, e), e), p, p′, t, exp(t, e)) = true
zkpsec(zkp proof(exp(exp(g, e1), e2), e2), exp(exp(g, e1), e2)) = true
Fig. 1: Equational theory to model H&P protocol
Property Result Time
Answer Origin Authentication × 26 s
Answer Origin Authentication∗ X (E,EA,C,NET) 3 s
Form Authorship × 3 s
Form Authorship∗ × 2 s
Form Authenticity × 33 s
Form Authenticity∗ X (E,EA,C,NET) 3 s
Mark Authenticity × 52 s
Mark Authenticity∗ X (E,EA,C,NET) 4 s
Question Indistinguishability × < 1 s
Anonymous Marking × 1h 58 m 33 s
Anonymous Examiner × 6h 37 m 33 s
Mark Privacy × 23 m 59 s
Mark Anonymity × 49 m 5 s
Fig. 2: Summary of our analysis on the formal model of the H&P
protocol; × indicates that the property does not hold despite all
parties being honest. (∗) are the results after applying our fixes.
Attack on RARC: ProVerif
shows that the RARC
fails to guarantee both se-
crecy of messages and
anonymity of sender and
receiver identities, which
is its main purpose inside
the H&P protocol. We re-
fer the triplet 〈c1, c2, c3〉
as the encrypted messages
that A submits to the
mixnet when she wants
to send a message to B.
From the description of
RARC given at the begin-
ning of this section, we re-
call that c1 encrypts the
A’s public key, c2 encrypts
the message to B, and c3 encrypts the B’s public key. All cipher-texts are encrypted
with the mixnet’s public key.
The attacker uses the RARC as a decryption oracle, letting the RARC reveal any
of the plaintexts. The attack works as follows. The attacker chooses one of the three
ciphertexts (depending on whether he wants to target the contents of the message, or the
identities of the sender and receiver) and submits this as a new message. For example,
if the attacker targets c1 = {IDA, PKA}PKMIX , he resubmits c1 as a new encrypted
message, which means that c′2 = c1 in the new triplet. He can leave the encryption of the
senders key and the proof concerning the key unchanged, but replaces the encryption of
the receiver’s key with a public key PKI for which he knows the corresponding secret
key SKI . In our example this means c′3 = {IDI , PKI}PKMIX . The attacker can also
provide the necessary proof of knowledge of plaintext, since he knows this plaintext.
The RARC then mixes the input messages, and sends the encryption of the mes-
sage under the receiver’s public key to the receiver. In our example the attacker receives
{IDA, PKA}PK I . Since the attacker knows the secret key SKI he can obtain the orig-
inal message. In our example he gets IDA, the identity of the sender which should have
remained anonymous. Since the attacker can substitute any of the items in the triplet
as the new message, the RARC does neither ensure secrecy of the messages nor the
anonymity of the sender or the receiver. Note that the checksum meant to guarantee the
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integrity of the triplet is only added after the submission of the message and is only used
inside the mixnet. Hence, the checksum does not prevent the attacker from submitting
a modified triplet. Even if it were added before, it would not prevent the attack as the
knowledge of the ciphertexts is sufficient to compute the checksum.
Note that the RARC was originally designed to withstand a passive attacker that
however can statically corrupts parties [35]. This is not realistic in the e-exam setting
where corrupted parties could actively try to cheat. Even an attacker that statically cor-
rupts parties can attack the RARC as described above. A corrupted party instructed
statically can send and receive messages via the RARC on behalf of the attacker. The
attacker still has to intercept those messages before they enter the RARC, but this is
possible with insecure networks such as the Internet.
All properties fail with such a RARC. But even if we replace this RARC with an
ideal implementation – which, according to the RARC original requirements [35], en-
sures anonymity of senders and receivers but not message secrecy, implemented as an
anonymous channel in ProVerif – the H&P protocol does not satisfy any of our prop-
erties. The next paragraphs details the findings, and Figure 2 summarizes the results
found assuming all parties being honest.
Authentication properties: We verified the authentication properties without and with
an ideal RARC. All the following counterexamples remain valid in both cases.
ProVerif finds a counterexample for Answer Origin Authentication where the at-
tacker can create a fake pseudonym that allows him to take part in an exam for which
he did not register. This is possible because the exam authority does not check whether
the pseudonym has been actually created using the partial information provided by the
timed-release service. The attacker generates his own secret key SKA, and calculates
an associate pseudonym, which sends to the exam authority. The exam authority suc-
cessfully verifies the received data and that the attacker knows SKA, thus the exam
authority accepts the answer. Regarding Form Authorship, ProVerif shows the same at-
tack trace that falsifies Answer Origin Authentication. In fact, the exam authority may
collect an exam form where the pseudonym is exchanged with one chosen by the at-
tacker.
ProVerif also shows that the H&P protocol does not ensure Form Authenticity, be-
cause there is no mechanism that allows the examiner to check whether the answers
have been forwarded by the exam authority. Even if the original RARC is used and the
answer is encrypted with the public key of the mixnet, this does not guarantee that the
exam authority actually sent the message.
Regarding Mark Authenticity, ProVerif provides a counterexample in which the at-
tacker can forward any answer to any examiner, even if the answer was not collected
by the exam authority. Moreover, the attacker can notify the candidate by himself with
a mark of his choice.
Privacy properties: ProVerif finds an attack trace on Question Indistinguishability. This
is because the attack on the RARC exposes the message and the identities of the sender
and receiver. As the questions are sent through the RARC, the attacker can obtain them.
Since the candidate’s answer is also sent through the RARC, Anonymous Marking does
not hold: the answer can be linked to its corresponding sender. The protocol ensures
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neither Mark Privacy nor Anonymous Examiner, as the marks are also sent through the
RARC. Hence, they can be decrypted and the examiner can be identified.
We checked the H&P protocol in ProVerif assuming ideal RARC case ProVerif
shows an attack for each property. Anonymous Examiner can be violated because the at-
tacker can track which examiner accepts the ZKP when receiving the partial pseudonym,
and then associate to the examiner the answer that the latter grades. Moreover, a similar
attack on Anonymous Marking remains: the attacker can check whether a candidate ac-
cepts the ZKP to associate him with a pseudonym, and then identify his answer. Mark
Privacy fails because the examiner sends the mark to the exam authority via the RARC,
which does not ensure secrecy. Finally, ProVerif shows that the H&P protocol does
not satisfy Mark Anonymity: the attacker can track which pseudonym is assigned to a
candidate and the mark is not secret, and link a candidate to the assigned mark.
Fixing Authentication We propose four simple modifications to the H&P protocol in or-
der to achieve a set of authentication properties. In particular, we prove in ProVerif that
the so modified protocol achieves Answer Origin Authentication, Form Authenticity,
and Mark Authenticity. We found no easy solution for Form Authorship as the protocol
sees no signatures for candidates, and RARC does not guarantee authentication.
Concerning Candidate registration, we observe that EA and NET do not need to
communicate anonymously via RARC, as the original protocol prescribes. Conversely,
they both need to authenticate each other messages to avoid considering attacker mes-
sage injections. Thus, the first modification consists on the NET receiving the partial
pseudonyms generated by EA via a secure channel instead via a RARC. In doing so,
the attacker cannot use the NET to generate fake pseudonyms.
As second modification we let NET send via secure channel the eligible pseudonyms
to the EA, who, in doing so, can generate ZK proofs of equality of discrete logarithm to
eligible pseudonyms only. The EA can also store the eligible pseudonyms, which can
be checked at examination before accepting a test from a candidate.
Concerning Marking, we note that the examiner cannot verify whether a test has
been sent by the EA. Since the anonymity requirement is on the examiner but not on
the EA, the latter can sign the test. Thus, the third modification consists on EA signing
the test prior to forward it to the chosen examiner, who authenticates the signature.
The last issue concerns the form identifier the EA affixes to the test before forward-
ing it to the examiner. Since the candidate is unaware of such identifier, the attacker can
notify him any other examiner’s mark. The forth modification sees the EA adding the
form identifier to the candidate’s submission receipt, which is also signed by the EA.
Also the examiner adds the form identifier to the marking receipt, so the candidate can
verify whether he has been notified with the correct mark.
5 Remark! Protocol
We first describe the protocol presented in [9] and then the results of our analysis.
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5.1 Protocol Description
The Remark! protocol has the same set of parties of the H&P protocol, but relies on a
different approach. The NET is indeed several servers that implement an exponentia-
tion mixnet [39]. The speciality of exponentiation mixnets is that each server blinds its
entries by a common exponent value. On entry X , the mixnet outputs Xr where r is
the product of the secret exponent values of the servers. At registration, the NET cre-
ates the pseudonyms for the candidates and examiners without involving any of them.
The pseudonyms are eventually used as public-key encryption and signature verification
keys in such a way to allow parties to communicate anonymously. A bulletin board9 is
used to publish the pseudonyms, the test questions and the receipts of test submissions.
The combination of the exponentiation mixnet and a bulletin board is meant to ensure
anonymity and verifiability.
Remark! only assumes that each party is given a pair of public/private key with
a common generator g, i.e. the private key x and the public key y = gx. Below, we
present the protocol within the four exam phases.
Registration: The list of eligible candidates’ and examiners’ public keys is sent as
a batch to the NET. The NET calculates the pseudonyms by raising the initial public
keys to a common value r =
∏
i ri. More specifically, each mix server raises the input
message to a secret value ri, and forwards it to another mix server. At the same time
the NET blindly permutes the batch of public keys. The so obtained keys eventually
become the pseudonyms for candidates and examiners. Along with the pseudonyms
y′ = yr = (gx)r, the NET publishes a new generator h, which is the output of g raised
to the product of each mix server secret value, i.e. h = gr. Both the candidates and
the examiners can identify their own pseudonyms by raising h to their secret key x, i.e.
hx = (gr)x. The pseudonyms serve as public encryption and signature verification keys
from now on. Two different batches are used for candidates and examiners because only
the identities of candidates are revealed at notification.
Examination: The exam authority signs and encrypts the test questions with the can-
didate’s pseudonym and publishes them on the bulletin board. Each candidate submits
his answer, which is signed with the candidate’s private key (but using the generator h
instead of g) and encrypted with the public key of the exam authority. The exam au-
thority collects the test answer, checks its signature using the candidate’s pseudonym,
re-signs it, and publishes its encryption with the corresponding candidate’s pseudonym
as receipt.
Marking: The exam authority encrypts the signed test answer with an eligible exam-
iner pseudonym and publishes the encryption on the bulletin board. The corresponding
examiner marks the test answer, and signs it with his private key (again using the gener-
ator h instead of g). The examiner then encrypts it with the exam authority public key,
and submits its marks to the exam authority.
Notification: When the exam authority receives all the candidate evaluations, it pub-
lishes the signed marks, each encrypted with the corresponding candidate’s pseudonym.
Then, the NET servers de-anonymize the candidate’s pseudonyms by revealing their
secret exponents. Hence the candidate anonymity is revoked, and the mark can finally
9 A public append-only memory.
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be registered. Note that the examiner’s secret exponent is not revealed to ensure his
anonymity even after the exam concludes.
5.2 Formal Analysis
We analyze Remark! with ProVerif, following similar techniques as the one used in
the analysis of the H&P protocol. Figure 4 sums up the results together with the time
required for ProVerif to conclude on the same PC used for H&P. We model the bul-
letin board as a public channel, and use the equational theory depicted in Figure 3. The
equations for encryption and signatures are standard, but we also added the possibility
of using the pseudonym keys to encrypt or sign. The public pseudonym, which also
serves as exam form identifier, is obtained using the function pseudo pub on the public
key and the random exponent. The function pseudo priv can be used to decrypt or sign
messages, using the private key and the new generator gr (modelled using the func-
tion exp) as parameters. The function checkpseudo allows us to check if a pseudonym
corresponds to a given secret key (or its pseudonym variant).
checkpseudo(pseudo pub(pk(k), rce), pseudo priv(k, exp(rce))) = true
decrypt(encrypt(m, pk(k), r), k) = m
decrypt(encrypt(m, pseudo pub(pk(k), rce), r), pseudo priv(k, exp(rce))) = m
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, pseudo priv(k, exp(rce))), pseudo pub(pk(k), rce)) = m
Fig. 3: Equational theory to model Remark! protocol
Authentication properties: Assuming an attacker in control of the network and all par-
ties to be honest, we can successfully verify all authentication properties in ProVerif.
To model properly authentication in ProVerif, where events need to refer to candidates
along the whole code, it was necessary to replace the candidate key (used to identify
the candidate) with the candidate’s pseudonym inside the events. This is sound because
there is a bijective mapping between keys and pseudonyms, and pseudonyms are always
available.
We also verified the authentication properties considering corrupted parties. In this
case, all properties are guaranteed except Form Authenticity. The attack trace shows that
a corrupted candidate can pick the examiner of his choice by re-encrypting the signed
receipt received from the exam authority. It means that the candidate can influence the
choice of the examiner who will correct his exam. As the protocol description envis-
ages an access control for publishing into the bulletin board, a feature that we could
not code in ProVerif, we cannot claim this to be an attack as the candidate may not
be allowed to post on the bulletin board. However, we demonstrate that with a simple
fix there is no need of access control policies for publishing into the bulletin board.
The fix consists in making the intended pseudonym of an examiner explicit within
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the signature that designates the examiner as evaluator of an exam. In doing so, the
exam authority’s signature within the receipt cannot be used by a candidate to desig-
nate any examiner because the receipt includes no examiner’s pseudonym. The exam
authority will only accept exam evaluations that contain its signature on examiner’s
pseudonym. Considering the fix, ProVerif confirms that Remark! guarantees all the se-
curity properties including Form Authenticity, even in presence of corrupted candidates.
Property Result Time
Answer Origin Authentication X (NET) < 1 s
Form Authorship X (C, EA, NET) < 1 s
Form Authenticity X (C, E, EA, NET) < 1 s
Form Authenticity∗ X (E, EA, NET) < 1 s
Mark Authenticity X (E, EA, NET) < 1 s
Question Indistinguishability X (E, EA, NET) < 1 s
Anonymous Marking X (C, NET) 1 s
Anonymous Examiner X (E, NET) < 1 s
Mark Privacy X (EA, NET) 3 m 39 s
Fig. 4: Summary of our analysis on the formal model of the
Remark! protocol. The parties which are assumed to be hon-
est for the result to hold are in brackets. NET is the process
that models the mixnet. (∗) after applying our fix.
Privacy properties: All the
privacy properties are satis-
fied. For Question Indistin-
guishability, we only assume
the exam authority to be hon-
est, and then conclude that the
property holds. For Mark Pri-
vacy, we assume only the con-
cerned candidate and exam-
iner, as well as the exam au-
thority, to be honest. All other
candidates and examiners are
corrupted, and ProVerif still
concludes successfully. Note
that this subsumes a case with
multiple honest candidates and examiners, since a dishonest party can behave like a hon-
est party. This also implies that the protocol ensures Mark Anonymity as noted above.
For Anonymous Examiner, we assume only the examiners and the NET to be honest.
If the NET publishes the pseudonyms in random order, ProVerif concludes success-
fully. Similarly for Anonymous Marking, we assume only the candidates and the NET
to be honest. Again, if the NET publishes the pseudonyms in random order, ProVerif
concludes successfully.
6 Grenoble Protocol
The third case study we analyze is Grenoble exam, which is paper-and-pencil procedure
used to evaluate undergraduate students at the University of Grenoble.
6.1 Protocol Description
The protocol involves candidates (C), an examiner (E), a question committee (QC), and
an exam authority (EA). It has four phases:
Registration: In Grenoble exam each student has an identity (student name + her
birthday), and a pseudonym (student number) which is assigned to her by the exam
authority when she registered to the course. All the students of the course are automat-
ically enrolled as eligible candidates for the exam; they are informed about the exam’s
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date, time and location. The QC, the course’s lecturer(s), prepares the questions and
hands them securely to EA.
Examination: After EA authenticates all Cs, EA lets them take a seat. There, each
C finds a special exam paper: the top-right corner is glued and can be folded. Each C
signs it, and writes down her name in such a way that the corner, when folded, hides
both the signature and the name. Each C also writes down visibly her pseudonym. EA
checks that each C writes down her correct name and pseudonym, then the glued part
can be folded and sealed. After that, EA distributes the questions and the exam begins.
At the end, EA collects the exam-tests, checks that all copies have been returned, that
all corners are correctly glued, and gives the exam-tests to E.
Marking: E evaluates the exam-tests: each pseudonym is given a mark. E returns
them, along with the marks, to EA.
Notification: For each exam-test, EA checks that the corner is still glued and maps
the pseudonym to the real identity without opening the glued part. Then, EA stores
the pairs identities/marks, and publishes the pairs pseudonyms/marks. After that, C can
review her exam-test in presence of E to check the integrity of her exam-test and verify
the mark. If, for instance, C denies that the exam-test containing her pseudonym belongs
to her, the glued part is opened.
6.2 Formal Analysis
We analyze Grenoble exam with ProVerif, using the equational theory depicted in Fig-
ure 5. The obtained results together with the time required for ProVerif to conclude, on
the same PC used for the previous case studies, are resumed in Figure 6.
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
unfold(fold(m, k), k) = m
authcheck(auth(m, s), genPublic(s)) = m
openauth(auth(m, s)) = m
seen(unseen(m, pk(k), r), k) = m
Fig. 5: Equational theory to model Grenoble exam
We use the standard equational
theory of digital signature (func-
tions: sign , checksign and getmess)
to model candidate’s signature. The
function fold , similar to symmetric
encryption, is used to hide candi-
date’s identity and signature. The key
necessary to reveal the hidden data
using the function unfold is included
inside the message, so that anyone
can unfold it. The function auth ,
similar to a signature, is used to model that everybody can see the other participants
and thus authenticate them using a secret (corresponds to the physical identity). The
attacker can get the content of the authenticated message using the function openauth .
The authenticated message can be verified by applying the function authcheck , using
a public value generated by the function genPublic. The function unseen , similar to
asymmetric encryption, is used to model that the attacker cannot see the content of the
exchanged messages. For instance when a candidate submits an answer, the others can
see that she is submitting an answer but cannot look into its content (this is prevented
by the authority which is controlling the exam room). The function seen is the inverse
of unseen . Note that, all the functions of Figure 5 are public functions, which can be
applied by the attacker.
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We use private channel for the transmission of the questions from QC to EA, as in
reality this happen in a secure way (so nobody can see this transmission). Similarly, the
authority provides a pseudonym (student number) to the candidate securely. We use a
table to model this; EA inserts the identity of the candidate together with her pseudonym
in the table, then the candidate gets it. Note that, in ProVerif, tables cannot be accessed
by the attacker.
Also we assume that, an examiner cannot register as a candidate. This is normal
since a candidate cannot be an examiner at the same time.
Property Result Time
Answer Origin Authentication X(EA) < 1 s
Form Authorship X(C, EA) < 1 s
Form Authenticity X(E, EA) < 1 s
Mark Authenticity X(C, E, EA) < 1 s
Question Indistinguishability X(EA, QC) < 1 s
Anonymous Marking X(C, E, EA) < 1 s
Anonymous Marking∗ X(C, EA) < 1 s
Anonymous Examiner × < 1 s
Anonymous Examiner† X(E, EA) < 1 s
Mark Privacy × < 1 s
Mark Anonymity X(C, E, EA) 30 s
Fig. 6: Summary of our analysis on the formal
model of the Grenoble protocol. (∗) E corrupted,
but cannot open the glued part. (†) private channel
between EA and E.
Authentication properties: ProVerif
verifies that all the authentication prop-
erties are satisfied, if the parties that
emits events (necessary for the con-
sidered property) are honest. This is
necessary for authentication proper-
ties, since otherwise the processes may
not emit some events when reached.
We make one assumption: the
EA only accepts one exam-test per
pseudonym. This is realistic as the au-
thority collects only one exam copy
from each candidate, which then has to
leave the exam room. This assumption
is necessary for Answer Origin Au-
thentication to hold. Otherwise, the at-
tacker can simply re-submit the candi-
date’s exam-test, and thus the EA will
collect twice the same exam-test from
the same candidate. Hence, the property is destroyed.
Privacy properties: ProVerif shows that Question Indistinguishability is satisfied by
Grenoble exam if QC and EA are honest. Otherwise, one of them could reveal the exam
questions, and thus break its secrecy. Anonymous Marking is satisfied if EA, E, and
the two candidates are honest. However, since it is desirable for Anonymous Marking
to hold even if the examiner is corrupted, we also consider the case where we have a
corrupted E. In that case we assume that the examiner still cannot open the glued part
(which would trivially break Anonymous Marking), as this would be detectable. Given
this assumption, ProVerif confirms that Anonymous Marking is satisfied by Grenoble
exam even if E is corrupted. Concerning Anonymous Examiner, ProVerif finds a coun-
terexample even if all parties are honest. The attacker can distinguish which “unseen”
exam-test is accepted by the examiner to mark (the one he can “seen” using his secret
key). This is not a real attack, since the examiner will only accept exam-tests from the
exam authority, not an attacker. If we assume a private channel between the EA and E,
ProVerif confirms that Anonymous Examiner is satisfied by Grenoble exam even with
corrupted candidates. ProVerif finds an attack against Mark Privacy (when all parties
are honest), this was expected as in Grenoble exam the marks are published in clear-text
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by the EA. However, Mark Anonymity is satisfied in case where we have honest EA, E
and two Cs.
7 Conclusion
We define the first formal framework for the security analysis of traditional and elec-
tronic exam protocols. We show how to model exam protocols in the applied pi-calculus,
and define nine relevant security properties: four authentication properties and five pri-
vacy properties.
Using ProVerif, we analyze the security of two electronic exam protocols and one
traditional exam. Our analysis shows that the e-exam proposed by Huszti et al. [8] in-
deed satisfies none of the nine properties. It security was only argued informally, while
we show that authentication is compromised because of inaccuracies in the protocol
design, and most of attacks invalidating privacy exploit a vulnerability in a compo-
nent that the protocol uses, namely the RARC. The attacks compromise secrecy and
anonymity of the messages taking advantage of the absence of a proof of knowledge
of the submitted message to the RARC, a vulnerability that allows the attacker to use
the RARC as a decryption oracle. Such a proof of security is not explicitly required in
the original specification of the RARC, and is certainly missing in the H&P protocol:
the “exam authority” is required to forward questions and answers without knowing
them, and thus cannot prove knowledge of them when submitting them to the RARC.
We proposed a few modifications on the H&P protocol in order to guarantee a subset
of the authentication properties. ProVerif confirms that the modified protocol ensures
these properties. However, even when assuming a perfect RARC ensuring anonymity,
we still have attacks on privacy properties. Thus, we think that fixing the RARC is not
sufficient – the protocol requires fundamental changes.
Also Remark!, the second protocol analyzed, has been only informally argued to
be secure in the original paper. Our analysis identified a weakness that violates Form
Authenticity when a candidate is corrupted. We propose a fix and formally verify that
the (fixed) protocol satisfies all the properties herein considered.
The third protocol, Grenoble exam, is used at Grenoble University but never for-
mally analyzed. Our analysis using ProVerif shows that it satisfies eight properties, and
fails concerning Mark Privacy.
Generally speaking, our framework and our analysis bring exams into the attention
of the security community. E-exams and in general computer-based assessment tools
are becoming widespread; some of them supported by e-learning platforms such as
the massive open online courses (MOOC). Nevertheless, they call for being formally
proved secure, since most of them have not been subjected to any rigorous security
analysis. Since they are complex systems and exposed to unprecedented cheating at-
tacks, their vulnerabilities can be very subtle to be discovered. Often they are argued
be secure only informally and the assumptions used in that argument, such as that au-
thorities are trusted, are not explicitly stated; they may be even unjustified in reality.
The same situation appears also for traditional exams. With this work we set the first
research step on the formal understanding of such systems and establishes a framework
for the automatic analysis of their security properties.
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As a future work we intend to analyze more protocols designed for computer-based
tests although obtaining protocol’s specifications from the providers is not an easy task.
Other interesting research directions include the definition of novel properties such as
verifiability, reliability, and accountability for exams.
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